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EDITORIAL NOTE
FUNCTION OF AFFIDAVITS AND PLEAS IN PROCEEDING
FOR JUDGMENT ON NOTICE OF MOTION
Two recent West Virginia cases have introduced into the
statutory proceeding for judgment on notice of motion two principles which perhaps will be considered novel by many practitioners.
In the first case,' the plaintiff sought recovery on eight
promissory notes, each for the sum of two thousand dollars, an
itemized open account for merchandise amounting to two
thousand twenty-four dollars and seventy-three cents, and an account for money advanced for the use and benefit of the defendant
in the sum of five hundred twenty-seven dollars and thirty-seven
cents. The plaintiff served upon the defendant and fied the
'Bluefield

(1928).

Supply Company v. Waugh, 106 W. Va. 67, 145 S. E. 584
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notice and the affidavit of merits prescribed by the statute.! Upon
the execution of a "writ of inquiry", the defendant, without having filed any counter affidavit or plea, insisted upon the right to
cross-examine the plaintiff's witnesses and to introduce evidence
of his own for the purpose of reducing the recovery. The court
conceded that he would have this right upon the execution of a
writ of inquiry in a common-law action but held that no such
right exists in the statutory proceeding. An intelligible discussion of the grounds upon which the court bases the differentiation
requires a limited review of the common-law background.
It is fundamental law that, in an action sounding in damages,
the trial of the case involves two separate and distinct inquiries:
(1) Is there a right to recover? (2) If so, what should be the
amount of the recovery? The first inquiry is always, in the first
instance, a pleading problem and is subject to the test of a
demurrer or the challenge of a plea in bar. On the other hand,
the amount of the recovery - the damages - is wholly an
evidentiary matter. Damages (except when damages are of the
gist of the cause of action) are not an element of the cause of
action, but are the result or consequence of the existence of a cause
of action.8 If there is a cause of action, it necessarily results that
there are at least nominal damages, but the existence of a right to
recover implies no more. Hence when a defendant fails to plead,
as on default or nil dicit, he thereby admits only a cause of action
and its necessary consequence, nominal damages.' If the plaintiff desires to recover more, he must resort to evidence on a writ
of inquiry. However, if the sum involved in litigation is
liquidated and certain, so that there may properly be a recovery
for only one certain amount, no writ of inquiry is necessary. In
such a case, the defendant, on default or nil dicit, admits not
only the right to recover, but also the amount of the recovery!
There is nothing to inquire into after the default.
Practical and important consequences result from this distinction between the cause of action and the damages. The only
proper function of a demurrer or of a plea in bar is to attack
the cause of action - to challenge the right to recover or some
§ 6.
sJenkins v. Montgomery, 69 W. Va. 795, 72 S. E. 1087 (1911).
"Bates v. Loomis, 5 Wendell 134 (N. Y. 1830); Havens v. Hartford and.
New Haven Railroad Company, 28 Conn. 69 (1859); Hickman v. Baltimore
& 5Ohio Railroad Company, 30 W. Va. 296, 4 S. E. 654 (1887).
heAlister v. Clark, 33 Conn. 253 (1866).
2W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 56, art. 2,
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part of it. Mere abatement of the damages does not in any sense
operate by way of reducing the cause of action or eliminating any
part of it, but only by way of subtracting from its consequences.
Hence it is improper to demur' or to plead7 to the damages; or,
as it is frequently stated, to demur or plead in reduction of damages. As a corollary to the last proposition, it must necessarily
result that, after default or nil dicit, a defendant, on a writ of
inquiry, must be permitted in the evidence to contest the amount
of the damages, as to any recovery above nominal damages, without the necessity of interposing a plea,' since the absence of a
plea could be taken as admitting only what it might controvert
if pleaded. These distinctions and principles are fundamental
in common law pleading.
However, a distinction must be made between matters which
constitute separate items or portions of damages and matters
which constitute separable parts of a cause of action. It is always
permissible to demur9 or to plead0 separately to a separable part
of a cause of action. Where the promise sued on is one for the
payment of money, each unit or portion of the money constitutes
a separable part of the cause of action. In fact, when an action
involving, such a promise is brought, the relief sought is essentially specific performance of the promise to pay money, rather
than damages for the breach. The truth of this proposition is
more readily apparent in an action of debt, where the verdict and
the judgment are for the debt; but the situation is substantially
the same in an action of assumpsit or of covenant on a promise
or covenant to pay money, where, although the verdict sounds in
damages, nevertheless the breach laid in the declaration is nonpayment of the money promised and the sum recoverable may in
fact be liquidated. In such cases, specific performance is sought
under the guise of recovery of damages for non-performance of
the promise, but the measure of the damages is the amount of the
sum payment of which would have constituted performance of the
promise. Hence the verdict and the judgment, under the guise
of awarding damages, really award specific performance of the
promise.
A true test whether the sum recoverable in assumpsit or
Note (1925) 31 W. VA. L. Q. 214 et seg.

7ldem.

'Havens v. Hartford and New Haven Railroad Company, note 4 supra.
11 CHrTTY, PLEADING (16 Am. ed. 1879), 696 et seq.
70
Idem, 549 et seg.
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covenant really stands as a measure of the cause of action itself,
or merely as a measure of damages awarded as wholly alternative
to performance of the promise, is the nature of the breach laid
in the declaration. If the breach is non-payment of money, then
the sum alleged as an element of the breach is a measure of the
cause of action; but if the breach is failure to do something else
(e. g. failure to build a house), then the sum alleged in the ad
damnum clause is descriptive of the mere consequences of the
cause of action.'
Propriety of the plea of part-payment (part-performance)
rests upon these distinctions. Such a plea is directed to a separable part of the cause of action. Otherwise, it would be bad as
a plea in reduction of damages. Of course, the plea is directed at
the sum alleged in the breach and not at the sum stated in the
ad damnum clause alleging the amount of the damages. A reduction of the sum alleged in the breach as measuring the cause
of action will necessarily be reflected in the amount recoverable
as damages under the ad damnum clause, but this is merely an
indirect result of the operation of the plea upon the cause of action
and not a direct attack by the plea upon the amount of the
damages.
The place which the statutory remedy and the decision under
discussion should take in the background of the general distinctions and principles stated will be largely determined by the
scope of the remedy. It will be noted that the remedy is applicable
only to contract claims. It is available only to a "person entitled
to recover money by action on any contract."
This language,
ambiguously, is sufficiently broad to cover all claims that might
be litigated in a common-law contract action, but it has not been
so construed. The remedy has been confined to promises to pay
money.
The promise need not be express. It may be quasicontractual and implied by law,' provided it be a promise to pay
money. The sum need not be certain and liquidated in the sense
that evidence in the nature of an inquiry of damages may be dispensed with,' but the inquiry is for the purpose of aiding specific
execution of the promise to pay, and not for the purpose of
11
Non-payment of damages does not constitute the breach and it is improper to allege non-payment of damages. Davisson v. Ford, 23 W. Va.

617 (1884).
12 Other pleas directed at a part of the cause of action,
e. g., a plea of
release, are subject to the same observations.
1
8White v. Conley, 108 W. Va. 658, 152 S. E. 527 (1930).
" 4Lambert v. Martin, 111 W. Va. 25, 160 S. E. 223 (1931).
See BURKS, PLEADnIG AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 1920) 181-2.
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supplying a measure of damages to be awarded in lieu of performance, as in a tort action or in a contract action where the
promise is to do something other than to pay money. Any attempt to reduce the recovery, whether in the pleadings or in the
evidence, will constitute an attack upon the cause of action or
some part of it. Hence, in such a case, if the defendant intervenes
in the evidence for the purpose of reducing the amount of the
recovery, whether he has pleaded or not, he is essentially undertaking to controvert a portion of the cause of action, and not
merely to reduce damages which flow from the cause of action.
Such being so, particularly when the summary nature of the
remedy is taken into consideration, it may very well be conceived
that it was not the legislative intent to grant the defendant such
a privilege in the absence of a counter affidavit and a plea.
That the decision of Bluefield Supply Company v. Waughir
was influenced by consideration of any such distinctions or principles does not expressly appear, although the opinion divulges
a general concept of the theory of the remedy which is in harmony
The
with, and suggests, some such inarticulate conception.
statute is quoted at length by the court for what it "seems to
contemplate". If reference is had here to the mere verbal import of the statute, as distinguished from the general nature and
purpose of the remedy, it would seem a little difficult to discover
anything in this statute which would differentiate it from the
statute7 which regulates the procedure in common-law actions,
The
where the court concedes a contrary practice prevails.
language of the two sections would indicate that the one was
adopted almost literally from the other. There is, however, one
The motion
substantial distinction between the two sections.
section provides that the plaintiff in his affidavit shall state "distinctly the several items of the plaintiff's claim", while the section
regulating the procedure in common-law actions has no such provision. Such a statement in the plaintiff's affidavit amounts to a
bill of particulars, gives definite and specific notice to the defendant, not of items of damages but of separate items or portions of
the cause of action itself, and, therefore, if the defendant has any
evidence to interpose, renders all the more inexcusable his failure
to file a counter affidavit and plead.
" Supra n. 1.

17

W. VA. REv. CODE (1931)

c. 56, art. 4, § 51.
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The argument based on the supposed nature and purpose
of the remedy is summed up as follows:
"Instead of making the statute a quick, informal and expeditious way for the assertion of such money claims arising
out of contract, (the evident design and purpose of the
statute), it would tend to make it cumbersome and prevent
suitors claiming such moneys ftom proceeding under it."
In the second of the two cases mentioned at the beginning
of this discussion, Nichols v. Island Gas Company,," it was held
that the defendant's counter affidavit denying generally liability
on the note sued on might be treated as the general issue for the
purpose of supporting a notice of recoupment.
"The statutory affidavit of a defendant upon a notice
of motion for judgment denying any indebtedness to the
plaintiff may be treated as in effect a plea of the general
issue."
Bluefield Supply Company v. Waugh is cited as the sole
authority in support of this proposition.
"We said in Bluefield Supply Co. v. Waugh, 106 W. Va. 67,
71, 145 S. E. 584, that an issue was made up by the defendant's
affidavit."
As has already been noted, what was actually decided in
Bluefield Supply Company v. Waugh was that the defendant
could not, on a writ of inquiry, cross-examine the plaintiff's witnesses or introduce evidence of his own unless he had filed a
counter affidavit and a plea. The only statement in the latter
case which might be taken as intimating that a defendant may
rely on his counter affidavit in lieu of a plea is the following:
"Moreover, it is the apparent object of this statute that
where the defendant desires to controvert any part of the
plaintiff's claim, an issue as to that part must be made up by
the counter affidavit, and the issue tried by a jury."
One would have surmised that the statement quoted was intended only to be a loose way of saying that, since the plaintiff
had served and ified an affidavit of merits, it was necessary that
the defendant file a counter affidavit as a condition precedent to
filing a plea making up an issue.
It would seem to require a
stretch of the imagination to accept Bluefield Supply Company
-170 S. E. 912 (W. Va. 1933).
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v. Waugh, on the face of the reported opinion, as authority for
the proposition that the counter affidavit might stand as a substitute for a plea.
Moreover, such a function of the counter
affidavit would seem to be foreign to the contemplation of the express provisions of the statute. The counter affidavit seems to
be required merely as a sanction of good faith conditionally
precedent to the fling of a plea. It seems to have been designed
primarily to serve an evidentiary, rather than pleading, function.
However, in spite of lack of prior authority and of the intent of
the statute, the innovation, as an original proposition, may be
justifiable as a permissible irregularity.
In view of the nature and purpose of the statutory proceeding and of the general liberality which has been accorded to its
functioning, it is believed that the holding in Nichtols v. Island
Gas Company is logical and correct and wholly in accord with the
court's prevailing attitude toward the remedy. The remedy has
always been treated with the greatest of liberality in its procedural details. Substance has never been sacrificed to form.
Moreover, to permit the counter affidavit to stand as a traverse
does no violence even to the principles of common law pleading.
It contains the same measure of negation and gives the same
measure of notice as the general issue in a common law action.
If (as in Nictols v. Island Gas Company) it denies the whole
claim, it may be treated as the general issue going to the whole
cause of action. If (as apparently would have been the case if
the counter affidavit had been filed and treated as a plea in Bluefield Supply Company v. Waugh) it denies only a part of the
claim, it may be treated as the general issue going to a part of
the cause of action. It is ordinary practice at common law to
plead the general issue to a separable part of a cause of action.
Enough has already been said to indicate that, owing to the narrow scope of the statutory remedy, such a treatment of- the counter
affidavit would not amount to pleading in reduction of damages.
0-Lo
CARLIN.
20For instance, in Peoples State Bank of Crown Point, Indiana v. Jeffries,

99 W. Va. 399, 129 S. E. 462 (1925), it was decided that the notice might
be supplemented by the plaintiff's affidavit.
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